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RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 4920  
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2163  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 011453

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SUBJECT: (U) SECRETARY CLINTON'S JANUARY 21, 2010, MEETING  
WITH EU HIREP ASHTON

REF: USEU BRUSSELS 65

Classified By: EUR A/S PHILIP H. GORDON. REASON: 1.4 (D)

[1](#)1. (U) January 21, 2010, 11:00 am - 12:30 pm, Washington.

[1](#)2. (U) Participants:

U.S.

The Secretary

Deputy Secretary Steinberg

EUR Assistant Secretary Gordon

PA Assistant Secretary Crowley

Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy Morningstar

Director for Policy and Planning Slaughter

NSC Director (EUR) Kvien

Deputy Chief of Staff Sullivan

EUR/ERA Deretic (notetaker)

EU

High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

Ashton

Director General for External and Politico-Military Affairs

Cooper

Director General for External Relations Vale de Almeida

Cabinet Member Everts

Spokesman Lutz

[1](#)3. (C) Summary. The Secretary and European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton met in Ashton's first official visit abroad as HiRep. Both agreed that the Lisbon Treaty's creation of an EU "foreign minister" provided an exciting opportunity for increased U.S.-EU engagement, especially on development. Ashton assured the Secretary that she was the only EU interlocutor on foreign affairs. On Haiti, the Secretary and Ashton agreed to focus on medium- and long-term plans and use Haiti as a model for a new development strategy. On Iran, they agreed there was progress with Russia, and the U.S. and EU should focus on engaging China. Both agreed Turkey needs to see the way forward to the EU but also do more domestically and on Cyprus to move towards the west. The EU is close to appointing a single representative in Kabul, but Ashton could not commit to an announcement before the London conference. The U.S. and EU should engage broadly with Yemen and look for opportunities to improve the economic situation. Ashton said she is still working out her Bosnia strategy. The EU asked for consultations on Kosovo. The Secretary asked for closer U.S.-EU cooperation on Pakistan assistance,

data sharing/privacy, and a joint crisis response capacity. Ashton urged follow-up on climate change. The Secretary and Ashton agreed to meet again in conjunction with the April NATO Ministerial in Tallinn. End Summary.

14. (SBU) The Secretary and Ashton agreed the U.S.-EU relationship post-Lisbon was exciting and promising, with a daunting range of topics. While the U.S. partnership with Solana was great, the U.S. and EU now could really unite efforts, especially on development--Lisbon was smart to combine diplomacy and development.

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HAITI  
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15. (C) The Secretary and Ashton agreed that it was important to focus on the medium and long term in Haiti. The Secretary suggested a strategic plan for using Haiti as a model for a new kind of development, along the lines of the Marshall plan. The idea would be to help businesses, build a middle class, allow the Haitian government to take responsibility while focusing on key objectives, and set the stage for long-term success. Ashton thought a new strategy would encourage involvement from EU countries, including those without current ties to Haiti. Ashton stressed the importance of linking trade and aid, as well as developing

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rule of law to promote investment. Ashton suggested key U.S. and EU officials meet in the days after the Montreal conference to work on a development timeline ahead of the donors' conference. All agreed the UN, U.S., EU, Inter American Development Bank, and World Bank would be the lead actors on assistance.

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IRAN  
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16. (C) The Deputy Secretary said 2010 would be a determinative year for Iran and emphasized the importance of the dual-track strategy. He and Ashton agreed conversations with Russia had been productive, but China was reluctant to engage. The challenge would be to shift Chinese thinking from viewing support for sanctions as a favor to the West to recognizing its own energy and security interests were at stake.

17. (C) The Deputy Secretary said UNSR 1874, the DPRK sanctions resolution, could be used as a point of departure for an Iran resolution. Ashton said the EU preferred China's agreement on sanctions. The EU FMs would discuss Iran January 25; the European Parliament was in favor of smart sanctions. Ashton aimed to take up Solana's former role in the P5 1/E3 3 dialogue. Cooper said the EU could place a tough interpretation on UNSC sanctions.

18. (C) The Deputy Secretary informed Ashton that Congress likely would pass legislation on Iran that would affect European businesses. While there could be flexibility on implementation, European companies, especially those in Italy and especially ENI, need to show restraint. Ashton said she would deliver a blunt message to Italian FM Frattini that night. The Secretary added Japan needed to stop investment. Ashton and the Secretary agreed India and Brazil should play a larger role on Iran. Urging India and Brazil to play a larger role on key issues was a long-term goal for Ashton. The Secretary asked Ashton to have Spain work with Brazil on how to be a major player.

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Turkey/Cyprus  
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19. (C) The Secretary said Turkey was giving up hope on EU

membership, and this represented a missed opportunity. Ashton replied that Turkey should be in the EU, but it was not working towards it. The EU's official position remains that Turkey is a membership applicant. Assistant Secretary Gordon said EU membership was the only leverage to sway Ankara on key regional issues, and urged Ashton to speak publicly about Turkey's EU path.

¶10. (C) Vale de Almeida asked for U.S. help on Cyprus negotiations. The Secretary said the U.S. was working on how to push things forward. The Secretary asked Ashton to coordinate with the U.S. on joint messaging to Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. She said the U.S. could not be seen too much in the forefront on the issue. Ashton hoped to travel to the region, and highlighted the importance of solving the problem for NATO-EU cooperation, including for protection of EU police trainers in Afghanistan.

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Afghanistan (also SEPTTEL on Ashton's meeting with SRAP  
Holbrooke)  
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¶11. (C) The Secretary asked Ashton to appoint a single EU civilian representative in Kabul ahead of the January 28 Afghanistan conference in London. Ashton said the EU had agreed to a single representative and promised a decision as soon as member states could agree on a name, but did not commit to have someone for London. Ashton noted the change would help the EU work on EUPOL-NATO issues. Ashton took up the Secretary's request for support in ensuring that the role of women in Afghanistan was emphasized through their representation in the London delegation and conference papers.

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Yemen  
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¶12. (C) Ashton was skeptical that the Yemen meeting on January 27 would bring real progress, but rather saw it as an opportunity to demonstrate interest in the Yemeni economy. She noted the EU had given Euros 100 million to Yemen in the past three years, with 100 million more to scheduled for the next three. With little going for it, Yemen needed international assistance. The Deputy Secretary responded that U.S. wants broader engagement with Yemen. The Yemeni government needed to walk the walk on political and development issues. The U.S. wants immediate cooperation on counterterrorism issues, but that was not the public message. With assistance, it was important not to over-commit without information about absorption capacity. Working groups might come out of the meeting in London. The Secretary noted that Saudi Arabia and Qatar had had a difficult time with their assistance in Yemen. Yemeni President Salih was hard to influence, and it was important to look for leverage. The Secretary said the U.S. had had good cooperation with the GoY on counterterrorism in recent weeks.

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Bosnia  
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¶13. (C) The Secretary called Bosnia a high mutual priority and welcomed Ashton's interest in continuing with the Butmir process. The Secretary asked for Ashton's support in enforcing 5 2 conditionality on transition from the High Representative to an EU Special Representative (EUSR), keeping the dual-hatted Office of the High Representative/EUSR, at least until October elections, and extending the EUSR mandate while possibly looking for a new representative. Ashton thought it would be possible to raise awareness of the EU with lower-level politicians to inject an EU context in the upcoming elections. While the U.S. and EU have had tactical disagreements, strategically it was important for the Bosnians to take ownership of the process.

Bosnian leadership needed to understand clearly the path to the EU and NATO. Ashton noted Croatia was leaning on Bosnia, and the EU could use Serbia's membership application as leverage to press Belgrade to do so, too.

¶14. (C) Ashton said she would meet with Swedish FM Bildt and Paddy Ashdown next week to brainstorm ideas for next steps. Cooper noted it was important to make the EU prospect real and suggested sending Polish farmers to meet with Bosnian farmers about the economic benefits of EU membership. The Secretary suggested Turkey and Russia could play a productive role if invited into the discussion.

¶15. (C) For the April NATO ministerial, the Deputy Secretary said the U.S. would be hard pressed to support MAP for Bosnia absent some concrete movement since the last NAC. Cooper noted that it was impressive when Serbian President Tadic said excluding Bosnia was a mistake. However, it was hard to make yet another concession on Bosnia without anything in return. The Secretary and Ashton agreed to consult further on the way forward on Bosnia.

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Macedonia  
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¶16. (C) Steinberg urged EU engagement to take advantage of the opportunity for an agreement between Greece and Macedonia on the name issue.

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Kosovo  
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¶17. Cooper raised the need to change the Kosovo-Serbia story, where the concrete was beginning to set. The Secretary noted that Serb participation in elections was changing the story on the ground, but Serbian FM Jeremic would not change his

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tune. The Secretary told Ashton she had had a tough meeting with Jeremic in Washington. The Secretary point out Montenegro recently recognized Kosovo. Cooper suggested a group from the EU visit Washington to consult further.

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U.S.-EU Energy Council  
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¶18. The Secretary and Ashton agreed on the importance of the new Energy Council, focusing on European security issues, including the Southern Corridor, and clean energy technologies. Morningstar asked Ashton for high-level EU visibility in the Southern Corridor area, as requested by leaders in the region. Turkish comments on gas flowing through Iran going to the Nabucco pipeline, a joint post-election action plan on Ukrainian energy, and Kurdish gas issues also could be topics for the Council.

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Pakistan Assistance  
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¶19. (C) The Secretary asked Ashton for closer U.S.-EU cooperation, and pointed out the opportunities for additional EU investment and assistance, including the World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund and Malakand Pilot Project Strategy, among other initiatives. Ashton said a free trade agreement wasn't possible, but that the EU was working on assistance to ready Pakistan for freer trade.

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Data Sharing/Privacy  
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¶20. (C) The Secretary and Ashton agreed to work closely on

data sharing/protection to conclude a binding agreement on the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), and secure the passenger name record (PNR) agreement. The Secretary said it was important to get the word out on the value of these agreements and suggested convening a group of experts on the issue. Ashton noted the European Parliament was becoming more reasonable and had a change of heart on opposition to body scanners.

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Joint Crisis Management Capacity  
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¶21. (SBU) Noting the Haiti crisis, the Secretary suggested the U.S. and EU continue work on developing a joint capacity for crisis management, especially combined planning, exercise, and training. She expressed U.S. interest in seconding U.S. personnel to EU operations and vice versa, starting with U.S. readiness to send one or two experts to the EU mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The U.S. and EU should be committed to increasing effectiveness and limiting duplication of effort.

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Climate Change  
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¶22. (SBU) Ashton raised Copenhagen follow-up as an important priority. While Copenhagen did not go as well as the EU would have liked, it was important to plan for the next opportunity.

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U.S.-EU Ministerial  
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¶23. (C) The Secretary and Ashton agreed to try to meet in conjunction with the NATO ministerial in Tallinn in April. Ashton assured the Secretary that she was the only EU interlocutor on foreign affairs.  
CLINTON